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Federal Notices of Violations in
Primacy States: Oversight or Overkill?
By TIMOTHY GRESHAM*
INTRODUCTION
By enacting the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977,' [hereinafter SMCRA or the Act] Congress intended
the states to possess primary responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of the Act's provisions. 2 This intent is sup-
ported by the duties granted to the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior, acting through the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement3 [hereinafter OSMREI. The Se-
cretary's duties include assisting the states in development of
state programs4 and cooperating with federal and state agencies
to minimize duplication of inspections and enforcement of the
Act.
The implementation of the Act was divided into two phases:
(1) the initial regulatory phase or interim program; 6 and (2) the
permanent program. 7 In the initial regulatory program, OSMRE
was granted the primary enforcement responsibility. States were
* Associate with the law firm Penn, Stuart, Eskridge, Abingdon, Va. Former
Asst. Atty. Gen. for Commonwealth of Virginia representing the Virginia Dept. of
Mines, Minerals & Energy from 1983-1987. A.B. 1976, Morehead State University; J.D.
1979, University of Tennessee.
The author wishes to acknowledge and express his appreciation to the COALEX
search service of the Interstate Mining Compact Commission for their assistance in
researching this Article.
I Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)).
2 SMCRA § 101(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (1982).
3 SMCRA § 201, 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (1982).
4 SMCRA § 201 (c)(9), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(9) (1982).
, SMCRA § 201 (c)(12), 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (c)(12) (1982).
6 SMCRA § 502, 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
SMCRA § 502, 30 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1982); 30 C.F.R. § 710.4(a) (1987).
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free to pursue their own regulatory and inspection programs 9 or
they could assist the Secretary in enforcing the initial regulatory
standards. 0 The states were not required to enforce the initial
regulatory standards, however, if they chose to enforce the stan-
dards the Secretary reimbursed them." Since all coal producing
states have either an approved permanent regulatory program
12
or have a federal program, 3 the initial regulatory program is
for the most part moot.
4
Under the permanent regulatory phase of the Act, 5 a state
desiring to obtain "exclusive jurisdiction' '1 6 over surface mining
7
1 30 C.F.R. § 720.11 (1987) ("Nothing in the Act . .. shall ... preclude a state
from exercising its authority to enforce State law.
10 Id. at § 720.12(b) (1987).
Id. at § 725.
SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
SMCRA § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
14 30 C.F.R. §§ 900-950 (1987).
" SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
.7 SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (1982). The Act uses the term "surface
coal mining operations." This term is defined as:
(A) [A]ctivities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a
surface coal mine or subject to the requirements of section 516 surface
operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, the
products of which enter commerce or the operations of which directly or
indirectly affect interstate commerce. Such activities include excavation for
the purpose of obtaining coal including such common methods as contour,
strip,. auger, mountain top removal, box cut, open pit, and area mining,
the uses of explosives and blasting, and in situ distillation or retorting,
leaching or other chemical or physical processing, and the cleaning, con-
centrating, or other processing or preparation, loading of coal for interstate
commerce at or near the mine site; provided, however, That such activities
do not include the extraction of coal incidental to the extraction of other
minerals where coal does not exceed 16 2/3 percentum of the tonnage of
minerals removed for purposes of commercial use or sale or coal explo-
ration subject to section 512 of this Act; and
(B) [Tihe area upon which such activities occur or where such activities
disturb the natural land surface. Such areas shall also include any adjacent
land the use of which is incidental to any such activities, all lands affected
by the construction of new roads or the improvement or use of existing
roads to gain access to the site of such activities and for haulage, and
excavations, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entryways,
refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil banks, culm banks,
tailings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing areas,
shipping areas and other areas upon which are sited structures, facilities,
or other property or materials on the surface, resulting from or incident
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within its boundaries may develop and submit a regulatory pro-
gram to the Secretary for his approval."' The Secretary cannot
approve the state program unless the statutory prerequisites of
Section 50319 are met. To meet those prerequisites a state pro-
gram must contain:
1) a state law providing for regulation of mining and recla-
mation in accordance with the Act;
2) a state law providing sanctions which meet the requirements
of the Act;
3) a state regulatory authority meeting the requirements of the
Act;
4) a state law providing for an effective permit system;
5) a process for designation of lands as unsuitable for mining;
6) a process for review in issuance of permits to avoid dupli-
cation with other federal and state agencies; and
7) rules and regulations consistent with the Secretary's regu-
lations.20
While Section 503 of the Act uses the terminology "exclusive
jurisdiction, ' 21 the exclusivity is tempered by the phrase, "except
as provided in Sections 52122 and 52323 . . . of this Act." 24 Upon
approval25 of a state program by the Secretary, the state is
deemed to be the regulatory authority over surface coal mining
operations in that state.26 Once the program is approved, the
state is then authorized to issue permits, 27 conduct inspections,
28
and to take various enforcement actions29 against operators not
to such activities....
Id.
Is SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
SMCRA § 503(a)(1)-(7), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)-(7) (1982).
2' Id.
SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
2 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
SMCRA § 523, 30 U.S.C. § 1273 (I982).
SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
SMCRA § 503(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(b) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 732.13 (1987) (As
of July 1, 1987, twenty-five states had state programs approved by the Secretary.). See
30 C.F.R. §§ 901-50 (1987).
30 CF.R. §.732.13(i) (1987).
- SMCRA § 506, 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (1982).
SMCRA § 517, 30 U.S.C. § 1267(c) (1982).
SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(d) (1982).
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in compliance with the state regulatory scheme.30 A state that
has obtained approval of its program, thus becoming the primary
regulatory authority over surface coal mining operations within
the state's boundaries, is known as a "primacy" state.3
I. AUTHORITY TO ISSUE NOTICES OF VIOLATION
Even though Congress found that the states should have
primary responsibility for enforcing the regulations,3 2 it never-
theless required some form of federal presence and oversight."
For example the Act specifically requires the Secretary to make
inspections of surface coal mining and reclamation operations
within a state for the purpose of evaluating the administration
of approved state programs.34 Moreover, if the Secretary has
information available which gives him reason to believe that any
person is in violation of the Act or any permit condition, the
Secretary must notify the state regulatory authority. 3 If the state
regulatory authority fails to take appropriate action, or to show
good cause for its failure to take such action, then the Secretary
is required to order federal inspection.3 6 Finally, it is clear that
the Secretary may, on the basis of a federal inspection, issue a
cessation order to a permittee 7 or operator for a condition,
3' SMCRA § 701, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) (1982). "Operator means any person,
partnership, or corporation engaged in coal mining who removes or intends to remove
more than two hundred and fifty tons of coal from the earth by coal mining within
twelve consecutive calendar months in any one location." Id.
" The term "primacy" is not used in either SMCRA or the regulations. It is a
term used to denote when a state has assumed the primary responsibility for adminis-
tration and enforcement of the Act as intended in 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
32 SMCRA § 101, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1982).
" "While it is confident that the delegation of primary regulatory authority to the
States will result in adequate State enforcement, the committee is also of the belief that
a limited, Federal oversight role . . . [is] necessary to assure that the old patterns of
minimal enforcement are not repeated." H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 593, 661.
- SMCRA § 517, 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (1982).
" SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(l) (1982) ("If no such state authority exists
the Secretary shall immediately order Federal inspection....
36 Id.
3, SMCRA § 701, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(18) (1982) "Permittee means a person holding
a permit." Id. "Permittee means a person holding or required by the Act or this chapter
to hold a permit to conduct surface coal mining and reclamation operations issued by a
State regulatory authority pursuant to a State program, by the Director pursuant to a
[VOL. 3:375
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practice, or violation that creates an imminent danger to the
health and safety of the public 8 or causes or can be reasonably
expected to cause significant imminent environmental harm.39
This Article will analyze whether the Secretary is empowered
by the Act to issue notices of violation, [hereinafter NOV's] for
violations of the Act or any permit condition, 40 when there is
an approved state program in place and no action has been
taken by the Secretary pursuant to the Act to remove the au-
thority of the state to regulate mining within its boundaries.
4'
A. Statutory Language of Section 521(a)(3)
Under Section 521(a)(3), 42 the Secretary's authority to issue
NOV's is limited to Federal inspections that are performed dur-
ing the enforcement of a federal program, 43 or a federal lands
program, 44 or a federal inspection carried out during the initial
regulatory program, 45 during the enforcement of a state program
in the event that the state is not enforcing any part of its
program, 46 or during the federal enforcement of a state program
after the Secretary has given public notice of the state's failure
to effectively enforce its program.47 This authority is contrasted
with the Secretary's authority to issue cessation orders48 when-
Federal program, or, where a cooperative agreement pursuant to section 523 of the Act
has been executed, by the Director in the State regulatory authority." 30 C.F.R. § 701.5
(1987).
m [T]he existence of any condition or practice, or any violation of a permit or
other requirement of this chapter in a surface coal mining and reclamation operation,
which condition, practice, or violation could reasonably be expected to cause substantial
physical harm to persons outside the permit area before such condition, practice, or
violation can be abated. A reasonable expectation of death or serious injury before
abatement exists, if a rational person, subjected to the same conditions or practices
giving rise to the peril, would not expose himself or herself to the danger during the
time necessary for abatement.
SMCRA § 701, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(8) (1982). See also, 30 C.F.R. § 701.5 (1987).
" SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1982).
- SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(3) (1982).
" SMCRA § 521, 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(b), § 1254(a)(3) (1982).
- SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(3) (1982).
SMCRA § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
- SMCRA § 523, 30 U.S.C. § 1273 (1982).
• SMCRA § 502, 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
- SMCRA § 504(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1982).
" SMCRA § 521(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(b) (1982).
- 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2), (a)(3) (1982).
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ever the Secretary determines that a violation, condition, or
practice creates an imminent danger. 
4
Under Section 521(a)(3), the types of inspections where the
Secretary can issue an NOV are quite clear, and the section
carries out Congress' intent of state" "primacy. '" 50 The issuance
of an NOV is authorized during the enforcement of a federal
program. If the Secretary is the regulatory authority,51 then
logically he must be empowered to issue NOV's to enforce the
requirements of the federal program., Moreover, the Secretary
must be empowered to issue NOV's during the enforcement of
a federal lands program. Congress did not grant primary au-
thority to the states to regulate surface mining on federal lands.
52
This authority was reserved to the Secretary and is expressly
exempted from the "exclusive jurisdiction" of Section 503.
Therefore, the Secretary must have the necessary authority to
issue NOV's to enforce the Act and the regulations against
surface mining operations on federal lands."
Congress also granted to the Secretary the primary respon-
sibility of administering and enforcing the initial regulatory pro-
gram. Because the Secretary was the primary enforcer under
the initial regulatory program, he was authorized and empowered
to issue NOV's while the initial regulatory program was in effect
in any state.
The Secretary, pursuant to Section 521(a)(3), has the au-
thority to issue NOV's when enforcing state programs under
Sections 504(b) and 521(b). The Secretary may only enforce a
state program under Section 521(b) after holding a public hearing
and publishing a finding that the state has failed to enforce all
or any part of its program effectively and has failed to demon-
strate that it will adequately enforce its program." Once the
SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1982) ("on the basis of any federal
inspection.
So SMCRA § 101, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (1982).
51 SMCRA § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 736.15(a) (1987).
" SMCRA § 523, 30 U.S.C. § 1273 (1982).
Id. However, "[any state with an approved state program may elect to enter
into a cooperative agreement with the Secretary to provide for state regulation of surface
coal mining and reclamation operations on Federal lands within that State .. " Id. at
1273(c).
' SMCRA § 502, 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
15 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(b) (1982).
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finding is published, the Secretary may then inspect mining
operations within that state and issue NOV's.6
Section 504(b) is somewhat more ambiguous. There seems to
be no requirement that the Secretary hold a public hearing or
publish a finding of the state's failure to enforce.57 However,
Section 504(b) cannot be read out of context. The title of Section
504 is "Federal Programs" and sub-section (b) immediately fol-
lows the sub-section authorizing the Secretary to promulgate a
federal program for a state that has failed to: (1) submit its
own program to the Secretary for approval; 9 (2) have a state
program approved by the Secretary; 6° or (3) adequately enforce
its approved program.61 Therefore, Section 504(b) clearly grants
the Secretary authority to enforce a state program during the
period prior to promulgation and implemention of a federal
program for that state.
The conditions which trigger Section 52 1(b) and Section 504(b)
are also different. The Section 521(b) procedure is triggered by
the Secretary's finding that violations of the state program are
resulting from a failure of the state to enforce all or part of its
program effectively; 62 Section 504(b) is triggered when a state
with an approved program is not enforcing part or all of its
program. 63 Therefore, it appears that Section 521(b) addresses
the situation of a state's ineffective or improper enforcement of
its approved program, while section 504(b) is addressed to a
state's total failure to enforce some part or all of its approved
program.64
The Secretary's authority to issue NOV's under Section
521 (a)(3) is undeniable when either the Secretary is the regulatory
authority in that state or the Secretary has taken the proper
56 Id.
11 SMCRA § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1982) ("In the event that a state has a
state program for surface coal mining, and is not enforcing any part of such program,
the Secretary may provide for the federal enforcement, under the provisions of section
521, of that part of the state program not being enforced by such state.").




-2 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(b) (1982).
63 SMCRA § 504, 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1982).
S"Id.
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actions to replace the state as the regulatory authority. Notice-
ably absent from Section 521(a)(3) is the Secretary's authority
to issue NOV's when the state has an approved program and
the Secretary has not taken action to supplant the state as the
regulatory authority. In a primacy state, the vast majority of
inspections conducted by the Secretary are either oversight in-
spections or inspections carried out pursuant to a citizen com-
plaint. 65 Neither Section 51766 nor Section 521(a)(1) 67 are
mentioned anywhere within Section 521(a)(3) as a grant of au-
thority to issue NOV's. Therefore, the Secretary is not empow-
ered by SMCRA to issue NOV's in primacy states during
inspections carried out pursuant to Section 517 or Section
521(a)(1).
B. Legislative History
SMCRA's evolutionary process commenced in the 92nd Con-
gress. During that session, one of the bills 68 introduced used
language in its enforcement provisions that was virtually identical
to the enforcement provisions contained in other federal envi-
ronmental legislation. 69 The enforcement provisions of those en-
65 SMCRA § 517(a), 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1267(a), 1271(a)(1) (1982).
SMCRA § 517(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (1982).
65 SMCRA § 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1982).
" S. 630, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
" Whenever the Secretary finds that any person is in violation of any
provision of this Act, he shall issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such provision, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance
with subsection (b)(1) of this section, requiring such person to comply with
such provision.
S. 630, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Admin-
istrator finds that any person is in violation of sections 111(e), 112(c), or
119(g), he may issue an order requiring such person to comply with such
section or requirement, or he may bring a civil action in accordance with
subsection (b).
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (1976).
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him, the Adminis-
trator finds that any person is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or is in violation of any permit
condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit
issued under section 1342 of this Act by him or by a state or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this Act by a State, he shall issue an order
[VOL. 3:375
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vironmental statutes and the 1972 precursor to SMCRA vested
the primary enforcement role in the federal agencies.70 It is
evident from its earliest manifestation, Congress intended that
the enforcement of any surface mining regulatory program be
carried out primarily by the federal government with the states
playing a role of lesser importance.
The Ninety-third Congress continued the process with con-
gressional committees reporting out two bills71 to regulate surface
mining. The Senate bill provided for a ten-day notice to the
state. Under the original enforcement provisions of S. 425, the
Secretary could issue orders that required correction of a viola-
tion when the state regulatory authority had failed to take ap-
propriate action. 72 However, the final version deleted this
authority for violations that did not create a danger to life,
health, or property, or cause significant harm to the environ-
ment. 73 These less serious violations were left to the state regu-
latory authority for correction. 74 The report stated that this
procedure carried out the Act's concept of state responsibility
for regulation of surface mining.
75
The House Committee's bill to regulate surface mining was
reported in the second session of the Ninety-third Congress.
76
Interestingly, this bill contained language in its enforcement
provisions nearly identical to the enforcement provisions found
requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he
shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1982).
70 S. REP. No. 1162, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1972).
, See S. 425, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11500, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
(1974).
11 "If the state fails to take such action, the Secretary is to issue an order requiring
the person to correct the violation." 119 CONG. REc. 1357 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Jackson).
71 S. REP. No. 402, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1973).
7 Interstate Mining Compact Commission, "Coalex State Inquiry Report No. 75,"
at 4 (Dec. 3, 1986).
75 Subsection (a) provides that if the Secretary has reason to believe that a
violation exists in a State with an approved State program he notifies the
State regulatory authority. The regulatory authority is directed to take
corrective action pursuant to the State program. This carries out the Act's
basic concept that each state should be responsible for regulation.
S. REP. No. 402, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1973) (emphasis added).
16 H.R. 11500, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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in SMCRA. 77 However, neither the Congressional Record nor
the committee hearings indicate where this enforcement language
originated. 78 There are no statements explaining the intent of
this language. Some language in the legislative history indicated
that the Secretary must issue an NOV when the state does not
require correction of a violation within ten days of notification
by the Secretary of the violation. 79 The House Committee felt
that this "limited federal oversight role" 80 was necessary to
prevent what it perceived would be a return to lax enforcement
by the states.
8 1
The enforcement provision language used by the House of
Representatives was adopted in conference, but the Conference
Committee did not adopt the House's explanatory language.
8 2
Thus, it would appear that although Congress adopted the lan-
guage giving the Secretary greater authority over surface mining,
it gave that language a much more restricted interpretation.83
Congress again worked on bills to regulate surface mining
in the Ninety-fourth Congress. Two essentially identical bills8
71 Id. at § 220.
7" Coalex Report, supra note 74, at 5.
" Upon receiving such information, the Secretary must notify the state or
[sic] such violations and within ten days the State must take action to have
the violation corrected. If this does not occur, the Secretary shall order
Federal inspection of the operation .... In the case of a violation which
does not cause such imminent danger, the Secretary must issue a notice
setting a period of no more than 90 days for abatement of the violation.
H. REP. No. 1072, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 142 (1974).
Id. at Ill.
11 "While it is confident that the delegation of primary regulatory authority to the
States will result in fully adequate State enforcement, the Committee is also of the belief
that a limited Federal oversight role ... [is] necessary to assure that the old patterns of
minimal enforcement are not repeated." Id.
" The Senate Bill and House Amendment contained similar enforcement
provisions which made available to the Secretary and State regulatory
authorities an array of sanctions and procedures for violations of the Act
and of permits. . . .The House Amendment, contrary to the Senate bill,
also made available to the Secretary the full range of enforcement sanctions
and provisions against coal operators pending the development of approved
state programs pursuant to the Act. The conferrees elected to opt the
approach of the House Amendment and to confine all enforcement pro-
visions in one section.
H. R. REP. No. 1522, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 78 (1974).
" Coalex Report, supra note 74, at 7.
See S. 7, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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were reported by the House and Senate. The enforcement lan-
guage was again virtually identical to Section 521. The House
Committee did not help to explain the intent of the enforcement
language since the explanatory language accompanying the bill
was basically a verbatim quote of the statutory provisions. 5 The
Senate, however, in its explanatory comments, clearly delineated
and defined the Secretary's authority to issue NOV's in primacy
states.8 6 However, the conference report contained no discussion
about the Secretary's enforcement authority, therefore, it is not
possible to determine which explanation, the House or the Sen-
ate's, accompanied the bill.
7
Finally, the Ninety-fifth Congress passed what is now
SMCRA. The enforcement provisions of the bills which even-
tually became SMCRA were changed little, if any, from the
previous bills which had been considered by Congress. The ex-
planatory language used still evidenced an intent that NOV's
could not be issued by OSMRE in a primacy state. 88 In confer-
ence the only differing issues arising out of SMCRA's enforce-
ment provisions concerned the suspension and revocation of
permits for patterns of willful violations89 and the procedures
that the Secretary could use to take over enforcement of state
programs. 90 Section 521(b) of the House's version permitted the
Secretary to enforce a state program upon a finding that the
state had failed to enforce all or any part of its approved
11 H.R. REP. No. 45, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 119-20 (1975).
86 In order to prevent federal-state overlap, the federal inspector is only
to use his authority under section 521(a)(3) where the Secretary is the
regulatory authority. However, in other circumstances, the Secretary must
insure, in accordance with the provisions of section 521(a)(1), that the
State is notified of the compliance problem so that it may act under the
terms of the approved state program.
S. REP. No. 28, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1975).
Coalex Report, supra note 74, at 8-9.
" S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1977).
SMCRA § 521(a)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(4) (1982).
'0 Another issue presented in the Enforcement section of the legislation is
the differing procedures by which the Secretary can enforce part of a State
program. The House receded from its position that the Secretary could
exercise this authority upon the finding of a State's effective failure to
enforce, and the conference adopted the Senate amendment's requirement
for a public hearing prior to such action by the Secretary.
H.R. RuE,. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1977).
1988]
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program.9 1 The Senate's version required the Secretary to first
hold a public hearing prior to the federal enforcement of a state
program. 92 The Senate's version was accepted; therefore, it is
clear that the Secretary must hold a public hearing prior to
enforcing a state program.
93
The Secretary has argued that the legislative history supports
the interpretation that the Secretary has the authority under
Section 521(a)(3) to issue NOV's in a primacy state without first
resorting to the procedures outlined in Section 521(b). 94 The
passages from the legislative history upon which the Secretary
relies to support this interpretation are at best ambiguous. One
passage states:
The Federal enforcement system contained in this section, while
predicated upon the States taking the lead with respect to
program enforcement, at the same time provides sufficient
Federal back-up to reinforce and strengthen State regulation
as necessary. Federal standards are to be enforced by the
Secretary on a mine by mine basis for all or part of the States
as necessary without finding that the State regulatory program
should be superceded by a Federal permit and enforcement
program. 95
The Secretary asserts that this statement reveals congressional
intent that the Secretary can issue NOV's in primacy states
without resort to the provisions of Section 521(b) for enforcing
a state program.9 However, a close reading of this language
would allow federal enforcement of a state program without
resort to the promulgation and implementation of a full-fledged
federal program. Indeed, in at least one instance the Secretary
has done exactly this.
97
9, H.R. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 521(b) (1977).
S. 7, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 421(b) (1977).
91 S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1977).
" See 44 FED. REG. 15302 (1979); 52 FED. REG. 21601 (1987).
91 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1977).
"6 52 FED. REG. 21601 (1987).
- See 30 C.F.R. § 936.17 (1987). The Secretary took over the enforcement aspects
of the Oklahoma State Program. No action was taken by the Secretary to implement a
federal program in Oklahoma, pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982). Oklahoma has
now regained full enforcement of its state program.
[VOL. 3:375
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Additionally, the Secretary refers to the following language
to support his interpretation:
The Committee intends that under sub-section 404(b) the Sec-
retary will use the enforcement authority granted him under
Sections 421(a)(1) through (4), if a state within an approved
program fails to enforce against an operator who is violating
the Act. 9
Section 504(b) allows secretarial enforcement of a state pro-
gram under the provisions of Section 521, including Section
521(b). Section 504(b) is simply a grant of authority to the
Secretary to enforce SMCRA in a state after a Section 521(b)
proceeding has been carried out and until a Federal program is
promulgated and implemented. 99 That Congress intended 504
enforcement to be limited to post-521 proceedings of the above
is even more evident in light of the Conference Committee's
statement accepting the Senate's version of Section 521(b) which
requires the Secretary to hold a public hearing before the Sec-
retary can enforce all or part of a state program and rejecting
the House's version that required federal enforcement after a
mere finding that the state had failed to enforce any part or all
of its approved program.100
" S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1977). While the Secretary uses this
statement from the Senate report, the Secretary neglects to include the previous two
sentences. "Promulgation of a Federal program gives the Secretary exclusive jurisdiction
for regulation of surface mining operations in the State in those areas not being
adequately enforced by the Senate. Surface mine operators need to know which regu-
lations - Federal or State - they must follow at any given point in time." Id. (emphasis
in original). Sections 504(b) and 521(a)(l)-(4) were S. 7's versions of Sections 404(b) and
421(a)(l)-(4) in SMCRA.
See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
10 S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1977). Contra 6 EASTERN MtN. L.
INST. 4-1 (1985).
The language of section 504(b) itself suggests that section 504(b) is a
substantive grant of OSM's enforcement authority; section 521 is, in turn,
the procedure by which that authority is to be exercised. The federal
enforcement mentioned in section 504(b) identifies section 521 generally.
Federal enforcement may be direct and exclusive under section 521(b) in
the event of a total, systemic failure of a state program, or it may be
specific and episodic under the provisions of section 521(a). It is this
second, specific kind of enforcement authority that OSM has relied upon
in the primacy states.
Id. at 4-6.
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C. The Regulations
The Secretary first proposed regulations that would not have
allowed the issuance of an NOV in a state that had obtained
primacy. 10' Under these proposed regulations, the federal inspec-
tor would have been limited to the issuance of NOV's as part
of the enforcement of the state program under Section 504(b)
or 521(b) of the Act. 02 The federal inspector would have been
authorized to notify the state of the violation but not to issue a
notice.103 OSMRE invited comments on this provision to deter-
mine whether the proposed regulation was a proper interpreta-
tion of the Act and its legislative history. 0 4
When the final regulations were promulgated in 1979,105 the
Secretary had changed his position from the 1978 proposed rule.
The Secretary noted that while the legislative history "does give
conflicting statements on this issue" of the authority to issue
NOV's in a primacy state, "the legislative history, when consid-
ered in conjunction with the Act,"' allowed the issuance of
NOV's during a state program.10 6 The Secretary concluded that
while Section 521(a)(3) does not specifically include oversight
inspections,10 there was no reason to believe that Congress in-
tended such a gap to exist in the statutory scheme. 06 The Sec-
retary determined that the issuance of NOV's would fill such a
gap and therefore that the regulation was authorized under
SMCRA. 109
The Secretary failed to realize that Congress intended the
statute to mean what it said. There is no "gap" in the statutory




101 44 FED. REG. 14,901 (1979), 30 C.F.R. § 843.12 (1979).
1o Id. at 15,302; See also Coalex Report, supra note 74, at 11, 30 C.F.R. § 843.12
(1979).
'1 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (1982).
,01 44 FED. REo. 15,302 (1979), 30 C.F.R. § 843.12 (1979).
"' Id. The Secretary stated that he has the authority to fill gaps in the statutory
scheme with implementing regulations which are consistent with that scheme. In Re:
Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 452 F. Supp. 327, (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd,
627 F.2d 1346, 1366-69 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Judge Flannery's decision concerning the filling
of a "gap" for water quality standards was reversed by the Court of Appeals).
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enforcement scheme of SMCRA. Any "gap" was not created
through oversight by Congress but by the Secretary's improper
interpretation of his role in the enforcement of SMCRA. The
Secretary, by his interpretation of Section 521(a)(3) and his
promulgation of 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2), has "created
his gap and filled it too."
110
In 1981, OSMRE proposed to delete the provisions giving
the Secretary authority to issue NOV's in primacy states."' The
proposed rule would have deleted that authority from 30 C.F.R.
Section 843.12(a)(2).1 2 The other alternative that OSMRE con-
sidered would have retained the existing language." 3 In 1983
after much delay, OSMRE issued a "policy statement '"" 4 which
concluded that 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2) was properly and
lawfully promulgated and therefore there was no need to recon-
sider the issue."' As will be discussed hereinafter, this regulatory
provision is for all practical purposes unassailable."
6
D. Case Law
Several courts have dealt, either directly or indirectly, with
the question of the Secretary's authority to issue NOV's in states
110 Presentation of Thomas C. Means, Esq., Eastern Mineral Law Foundation,
Special Institute on Surface Mining, Arlington, Virginia, March 21-22, 1986.
- 46 FED. REG. 58,467 (1981), 30 C.F.R. § 843.12 (1981).
,,2 When, on the basis of any Federal inspection other than one described
in paragraph (a)(l) of this section, an authorized representative of the
Secretary determines that there exists a violation of the Act, the State
program, or any condition of a permit or exploration approval required
by the Act which does not create an imminent danger or harm for which
a cessation order must be issued under § 843.11, the authorized represen-
tative shall give a written report of the violation to the State and to the
permittee so that the appropriate enforcement action can be taken by the
State. Where the State fails within ten days after notification to take the
appropriate action to cause the violation to be corrected, or to show good
cause for such failure, the authorized representative shall reinspect and if
the violation continues to exist, shall issue a notice of violation or cessation
order, as appropriate. No additional notification to the State by the Office
is required- before the issuance of a notice of violation, if previous notifi-
cation was given" under § 842.11 (b)(l)(ii)(B) of this chapter.
30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1987). (Emphasis added).
13 46 FED. REG. 58,467-468 (1981), 30 C.F.R. § 843.12 (1981).
"11 48 FED. RFG. 9,199 (1983), 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1983).
11 Id.
116 See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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that have obtained primacy." 7 One of the earliest cases, while
not dealing with this authority directly, contains some interesting
statements concerning the Secretary's role in the oversight of
state programs." 8 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in holding that the Secretary had the authority to
impose specific informational requirements concerning the per-
mitting process, stated:
Interested persons may also report suspected violations of the
Act .. .to the Secretary, and if he has reason to believe the
allegations he must notify the state regulatory authority. Act
§ 521(a). If the state fails to take appropriate action, the
Secretary is to order a federal inspection of the mine site. Id.
Violations that threaten imminent environmental harm are to
be halted by a cessation order from the Secretary. Act §
521(a)(2).119
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, reviewing
the Secretary's authority under Section 521(a), did not consider
the Secretary to have the authority to issue NOV's in states
which had obtained primacy. 20 Indeed, the court makes note of
the independence of a state administering an approved state
program under the Act as contrasted with the federal and state
roles under the Clean Water Act.' 2' Even the dissent noted that
if a state failed to carry out its responsibilites under SMCRA,
the Secretary could enforce the Act against the particular mines, 22
and that the Secretary could assume full responsibility with the
state. 
123
"' See infra notes 118-296 and accompanying text.
"' In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d. 514 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
"9 Id. at 519.
20 Id.
z "The independence of a state administering an approved state program under
the Surface Mining Act may be contrasted with the continuing role of the Environmental
Protection Agency after the state has assumed responsibility for pollution discharge
permits under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976
and Supp. H 1978)." Id. at 519 n.7.
Id. at 534 (citing section 521(a)(2)).
23 Id. at 534. Judge Tamm in dissent stated, "we would turn Congress's scheme
on its head were we to allow that supervisory authority to consume state discretion and
to reduce state power to a purely ministerial implementation of a federally devised
program." Id.
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Several other cases have dealt with the issue of the Secretary's
authority to issue NOV's in states. In Drummond Coal Com-
pany, Inc. v. Hodel,124 the district court enjoined the Secretary
from enforcing a cessation order issued to Drummond pending
final determination of the proceedings.1
25
The issue in Drummond arose when the Alabama Surface
Mining Commission (ASMC) 126 granted Drummond extension
orders for reclamation at three of Drummond's mines. The
Secretary contended that Drummond had not reclaimed the areas
"in a timely manner" 27 and, thus, was in violation of the federal
regulations. 28 The court held that ASMC had properly carried
out its duties under the Act and was "in as good a position as
OSM, or in a better position than OSM, to evaluate and to
decide whether or not these particular reclamations in Alabama
were 'timely.' 129 While the court did not specifically address
the issue of the Secretary's authority to issue the notice of
violation or whether 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2) was proper,
the court did note that it was not willing to contribute to making
the Secretary the exclusive enforcer of SMCRA. 30
In United States v. Camp Coal Company, the District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama dealt with this issue more
specifically.' 3 In Camp Coal, an OSMRE inspector issued a ten-
day notice to ASMC asserting that two violations were present
on the site. After receipt of the ten-day notice, ASMC inspected
the site and notified OSM that no violation existed. The Secre-
tary determined that the ASMC response was inappropriate and
,2 No. 85-AR-1411-S (N.D. Ala. June 5, 1985).
" A district court may grant such temporary relief as it deems appropriate pending
final determination of the proceedings if (1) all parties have been notified and given an
opportunity to be heard; (2) the requestor shows there is a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits; and (3) the temporary relief will not adversely affect the public
health or safety or cause significant imminent environmental harm. SMCRA § 526, 30
U.S.C. § 1276(c) (1982).
26 The Alabama Surface Mining Commission is "deemed the regulatory authority
in Alabama for all surface coal mining and reclamation operations . 30 C.F.R. §
901.10 (1987).
1- 30 C.F.R. § 715.13(a) (1987).
12 Id.
Drummond, slip op. at 5.
Id. at 4.
, 637 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
1988]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
issued Camp Coal a notice of violation. 3 2 Camp Coal continued
to adhere to the ASMC guidelines, but was later issued a ces-
sation order by the Secretary for failure to abate the notice of
violation.'33
The dispute arose when the Secretary assessed Camp Coal a
civil penalty of $22,500.00 on the cessation order. 3 4 Evidently,
an OSMRE inspector informed Camp Coal that, if they did not
have the money, they should try to appeal the violations and
assessment without prepaying the civil penalty. When Camp Coal
attempted to challenge the enforcement actions, the Secretary
moved to dismiss the appeal for failure to prepay the penalty.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the Secretary's
motion, and the Secretary filed an action in the district court to
collect the civil penalty.'35
The district court first held that the Secretary had waived
the prepayment requirement through the actions and words of
the inspector.' 3 6 The court went on to reason that, even if the
Secretary had not waived prepayment, Camp Coal did not owe
the penalty because the Secretary did not have the authority to
issue the underlying NOV.'37 The court cited Clinchfield Coal
Company v. Hodel,138 and held that the Secretary did not have
the authority to issue the notice of violation and that the actions
of the Secretary did not become valid and enforceable just
because the operator failed to prepay the civil penalty.'3 9
In Ryan's Coal Company, Inc. v. OSM, 4° the court was
asked to review the denial of temporary relief by a Department
I d. at 338.
.33 Id.
,31 Id. at 339. Cessation orders issued pursuant to 30 U.S.C. section 1271(a)(2) and
30 C.F.R. section 843.11(b)(1) are to be assessed a civil penalty of not less than 750
dollars per day for a period not to exceed thirty days. SMCRA § 518, 30 U.S.C. §
1268(h) (1987); 30 C.F.R. § 845.15(b) (1987).
- Camp Coal, 637 F. Supp. at 339. Civil penalties assessed must be paid as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to obtaining administrative relief. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (1982).
Civil penalties owed are coverable in civil actions brought in the appropriate court. 30
U.S.C. § 1268(d).
-6 Camp Coal, 637 F. Supp. at 340.
, Id. at 341.
"' 640 F. Supp. at 334 (W.D. Va. 1985).
,19 Camp Coal, 637 F. Supp. at 341.
-, No. CV83-PT-0623-J (N.D. Ala. April 4, 1983).
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of Interior ALJ. The court did not set forth the facts of the
case; however, it seems that the operator was issued enforcement
actions by the ASMC. The ASMC was enjoined from taking
further action by an Alabama state court. The Secretary issued
a ten-day notice to the ASMC notifying the state of the operator
violation and requiring the ASMC to take enforcement action
against the coal company. The ASMC responded by stating that
it had been enjoined from taking enforcement action by the state
court. After determining the response to be inappropriate, the
Secretary issued a cessation order to Ryan's.'
4'
The court, after reviewing Section 521(a)(2), came to the
conclusion that SMCRA did not grant the Secretary the authority
to issue the enforcement action against Ryan's. The court rea-
soned that the only possible statutory basis for the Secretary's
authority was Section 521(a)(3).142 The opinion notes that the
federal inspection which led to the issuance of the enforcement
action, was not carried out during the enforcement of a federal
program or a federal lands program nor was it a federal inspec-
tion pursuant to the interim program or Section 504(b).1 43 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the inspection could only have
been one that was carried out during the federal enforcement of
a state program. However, the court noted that the inspection
was not carried out pursuant to Section 521(b) because the
procedures of Section 521(b) had not been followed by the
Secretary. I"
Addressing 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2) and the Federal
Register comments, 45 the court discussed the Secretary's recog-
nition of a "gap" in the enforcement scheme of the Act and
stated that the question to be decided was whether 30 C.F.R.
Section 843.12(a)(2) filled that "gap."46 Specifically stating that
it would not determine whether it had jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the regulation, the court did state that such an
'4' Id., slip op. at 2 n.l.
142 Id., slip op. at 3.
3 ld., slip op. at 4.
I- Id.
,,1 44 FED. REG. 15,302-303 (1979), 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1987).
1, Ryans, slip op. at 6.
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inquiry was pertinent to the Secretary's intent in the adoption
of Section 843.12(a)(2).'
47
The opinion then cites various sections of SMCRA indicating
the goal of federal/state cooperation under SMCRA' 48 and the
policy of avoiding duplicative enforcement of SMCRA.' 49 The
court held that its review of SMCRA's statutory scheme gave
no indication of any congressional intent that the Secretary had
concurrent enforcement authority in a state with primacy where
"the appropriate state regulatory agency has taken appropriate
action as mentioned in Section 1271. '"15
Finally, the court concluded that 30 C.F.R. Section
843.12(a)(2) was intended to fill the "gap" resulting from a
failure of a state to take appropriate action.' 5 ' The court deter-
mined that ASMC had taken such action and that the state court
injunction constituted "good cause for failure to take such ac-
tion.'" 52
Clinchfield Coal Company v. HodePl3 is a prime example of
the problem that arises under the Secretary's interpretation that
he has authority to issue NOV's in a primacy state. In Clinch-
field, the coal company operated a surface coal mining operation
in Virginia under a permit issued by the state regulatory author-
ity.'5 4 After Virginia had its program approved, Clinchfield sub-
miited an amendment to its permit. The amendment was based
upon an interpretation of the Virginia regulations by the regu-
latory authority.'55 The state regulatory authority was informed
that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulations did not
allow the amendment and a ten-day notice was issued by
OSMRE.'5 6 The Secretary was informed by Virginia that the
amendment was approved pursuant to Virginia's regulation and
Virginia's interpretation of that regulation. 57 The Secretary de-
141 Id.
Id., slip op. at 7-8.
Id., slip op. at 8.
0 Id.
Id., slip op. at 9.
12 Ryans, slip op. at 9.
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termined that the response was inappropriate and issued a notice
of violation to Clinchfield and Clinchfield appealed.'
On appeal from denial of temporary relief the court first
determined that the only issue to be decided was whether Clinch-
field had shown a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits.15 9
The court discussed the language of the Virginia regulation
and the testimony adduced at the administrative hearing con-
cerning Virginia's interpretation of its regulations.6 Finding that
there was no equivalent provision in the federal regulations, the
court stated the interpretation of the agency promulgating these
regulations, should be accorded great weight.' 61 Additionally, the
court held that Virginia had the authority to promulgate variance
and that this authority had been confirmed by the Secretary in
approving the Virginia program.
62
Reviewing the Secretary's authority to issue notices of viol-
ations in primacy states, the court noted the difference between
Section 521(a)(2)'s language of "any federal inspection"'' 63 and
Section 521(a)(3)'s usage of much more restrictive language.'6
The court stated enforcement of a federal program was not
involved nor was there enforcement under Section 502 since
Virginia had obtained approval of its permanent program in
1981.165 Section 521(b) had not been used because the procedures
contained within that subsection had not been instituted.'" Fi-
nally, the court found that the inspection had not been carried
out pursuant to Section 504(b) and, therefore, the Secretary's
inspection did not fall within any of the specific types of in-
spections listed under Section 521(a)(3).
67
The Clinchfield court concluded that 30 C.F.R. Section
843.12(a)(2) was the Secretary's only source of authority to issue
"I Id. at 336-337.
19 Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 339.
10 Id. at 339-340.
16, Id. at 340.
162 Id.
"' SMCRA § 521(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1982).
4 Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 340-341.
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the notice of violation against Clinchfield. 68 Noting that the
legislative history of Section 521 (including the Senate report on
S. 7)169 indicated that Section 843.12(a)(2) went beyond the scope
of authority granted to the Secretary under the Act, the district
judge recognized that the section was in direct conflict with the
intent of Congress to grant primacy to the states except in the
instance where imminent danger of environmental harm was
occurring. 70 In granting Clinchfield temporary relief, the court
stated:
If the term "primacy" is to have any meaning, then the State
Regulatory Authority must have principal responsibility for
interpreting and enforcing its own regulations in the Surface
Mining Act. If the state fails to enforce the Act, then OSM
may take action to withdraw approval of the state program
under 30 U.S.C. Section 1271(b). I do not believe that Con-
gress intended the OSM to serve as a duplicative regulatory
body, conducting inspections and directly issuing NOV's, es-
pecially where the state authority has made a determination
that no violation exists.1
7
1
The Secretary filed a motion to reconsider the order, 72 ar-
guing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
review the provisions of 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2) and that
the ruling would seriously impair the Secretary's ability to en-
force SMCRA. 173 In its supplemental opinion1 74 the court rec-
ognized that under the prevailing decisions of the fourth circuit,'
the court might not have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of the Secretary's regulations, however, the court noted that the
Secretary conceded that the district court had jurisdiction over
the question of temporary relief even if the resolution of the
268 Id.
169 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 92 (1977).
170 Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 342.
272 Id. at 342-343.
7 Id. at 343.
17 Id.
,1 The courts supplemental opinion, which was issued on September 25, 1985, is
included with the original opinion at Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 342.
'" Id. at 334 (citing Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Dep't of Conservation and
Economic Dev. v. Watt); see also 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1984); Tug Valley Recovery
Center v. Watt, 703 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1983).
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question requires interpretation of the Secretary's regulations. 76
The decisive issue in the Clinchfield case was which of the
two regulating bodies had the power to issue authoritative inter-
pretations of the regulations and to enforce those interpretations
against operators. 77 The court held that its earlier opinion did
not pass on the validity of the Secretary's authority to issue
NOV's in a primacy state and concluded only that Clinchfield
was unlikely to prevail on the merits.178
The Secretary appealed the decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit. In a per curiam opinion,
the fourth circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case
back to the district court with instructions to dissolve the prelim-
inary injunction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 79 Thus,
the only issue decided by the fourth circuit was whether or not
the district court had jurisdiction to review the validity of 30
C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2).180
Since Judge Kiser made it very clear in the September 20,
1985 opinon that he had not passed upon the validity of the
federal regulation but had only discussed the regulation in con-
text of the various issues in the case, the holding of the fourth
circuit in this case is most inexplicable. The district court in its
supplemental opinion noted that there were at least three other
issues in Clinchfield's claim for temporary relief and that the
decisive issue in the case was which regulating body was empow-
ered to issue authoritative interpretations of the Virginian regu-
lations and to enforce those interpretations against operators.18
It appears that the fourth circuit either misread the issue in the
district court's decision or chose instead to ignore the real issues
16 Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 344.
" Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-345.
" Clinchfield Coal Co. v. D.O.I., 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986).
tso Since this represents an attack upon the regulation, the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Virginia did not have jurisdiction to consider this point or make
this finding. Such district court does have jursidiction to consider temporary relief sought
by Clinchfield Coal Company in this matter, so long as it does not take into consideration
the merits of the federal regulations in addressing the likelihood of success for prelimi-
nary relief under 30 U.S.C. 1276(c).
Id. at 103-104.
,' Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 344-345.
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and rely solely upon the court's discussion of the authority of
OSM to issue violations in a primacy state.1
2
In Annaco, Inc. v. Hodel,8 3 the Secretary issued a cessation
order against Annaco and four individuals for conducting sur-
face coal mining operations without a permit.'8 After the ALJ
denied its petition for temporary relief, Annaco appealed to the
district court." 5 Annaco argued that OSMRE did not have ju-
risdiction to issue the cessation orders to Annaco because Ken-
tucky had an approved state program.
86
The court, in denying temporary relief to Annaco, stated
that SMCRA, in the area of primacy, "includes requirements
and fosters expectations which conflict.' ' 87 Several sections of
SMCRA, the court pointed out, contradict the "exclusive juris-
diction" granted in Section 503.188 Those Sections include, ac-
cording to the court, Sections 521(d), 504(b), 517, and 521(a)(1).1
8 9
The court determined that Section 504(b) gave OSMRE the
authority through its oversight role to partially assume, on a
mine-by-mine basis, the state's enforcement role.' 90 Discussing
statments from the legislative history, the court noted that,
"Congress foresaw the probability that the Secretary would need
to take enforcement action . . . to ensure compliance with the
standards of the Act which did not merit elimination of all or
part of a state's program."' 9' After quoting the language at
Sections 521(a)(1-3), the court held OSMRE had jurisdiction to
"I On remand the district court denied Clinchfield's request for temporary relief.
Assuming that the Secretary's oversight authority permitted the Secretary to override the
Virginia Regulations, the court found that Virginia's Regulations as interpreted were less
stringent than the Secretary's and therefore could not be applied. However, the court
transferred the challenge to the validity of 30 C.F.R. section 843.12(a)(2) to the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Clinchfield, 640 F. Supp. at 344.
113 No. 87-13 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 1987).
I Id., slip op. at 2-3.
, Id., slip op. at 3.
I8 d.
887 Id., slip op. at 7.
Id., slip op. at 8-9.
Annaco, slip op. at 8 (citing SMCRA §§ 521(d), 504(b), 517, 521(a)(1), 30
U.S.C. §§ 1271(d), 1254(b), 1267, 1271(a)(1) (1982)).
19 Id., slip op. at 10-11.
"I Id., slip op. at 11.
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issue a cessation order against an operator in Kentucky under
the provisions of Section 504(b).
192
While this language does support the Secretary's position
that SMCRA authorizes the issuance of enforcement actions in
primacy states, a closer reading of the facts of the case indicate
that it was unnecessary for the court in Annaco to reach this
issue. The enforcement action at issue in Annaco was a cessation
order. The Act authorizes the issuance of two different types of
cessation orders. 193 A cessation order issued pursuant to Section
521(a)(2) is to be issued when a violation, condition, or practice
constitutes an imminent danger to the public health and safety
"or is causing or can reasonably be expected to cause significant
imminent environmental harm to land, air, or water re-
sources. "94 A cessation order issued pursuant to Section 521(a)(3)
is to be issued when a violation cited in an NOV is not abated
within the time limits set forth in the NOV. 195 Because the
cessation order at issue in Annaco was issued for Annaco's
having conducted mining without a permit, the cessation order
was one authorized by Section 521(a)(2).196 As has been earlier
stated in this Article, there is no doubt that SMCRA clearly
authorizes the issuance of an imminent danger cessation order
during any federal inspection, including federal inspections con-
ducted in primacy states. 97 The legislative history of SMCRA
clearly indicates that Congress intended imminent danger cessa-
tion orders to be issued whether the Secretary or the state was
the regulatory authority. 98 Therefore, it is clear that the court's
opinion in Annaco went far beyond what was necessary to
support the issuance of the cessation order to Annaco. The
192 Id., slip op. at 15.
191 SMCRA § 521(a)(2), (3), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1271(a)(2), (3) (1982).
I" SMCRA § 521(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 843.1 l(a) (1982).
19, SMCRA § 521(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1271(a)(3) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 843.11(b)
(1982).
I "Surface coal mining and reclamation operations conducted by any person
without a valid surface coal mining permit constitute a condition or practice which
causes or can reasonably be expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm
to land, air or water resources .. " 30 C.F.R. § 843.11(a)(2) (1982).
'9 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
' See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977); see also S. REP. No.
128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 1445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 45, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1975) (using identical language).
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cessation order was properly issued pursuant to Section 521(a)(2)
and 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2).
E. Challenging the Regulations and Interpretations
Clinchfield Coal Company v. DOI199 illustrates the problem
that mine operators face when challenging the authority of the
Secretary to issue NOV's in primacy states.2" Section 526(a)
requires that challenges to the Secretary's regulations be brought
in the District Court for the District of Columbia within sixty
days of promulgation of the regulation. 20 1 There has been some
question as to whether or not this section lays exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the District Court of the District of Columbia. 20 2 The
majority of the courts which have addressed this issue have held
that the language of Section 526(a) does limit jurisdiction to
hear regulatory challenges to the District Court for the District
of Columbia. 23 Therefore, the only viable method to challenge
the Secretary's authority to promulgate 30 C.F.R. Section
843.12(a)(2) would be to file a petition for rulemaking under
Section 201, 204 that requires the Secretary to repeal Section
843.12(a)(2) and then challenge the Secretary's denial of such
petition in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 205
1 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986).
2 Id.
-1 SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1)(1982); see Note, Statutory Time
Limitations on the Availability of Judicial Review of Regulations under SMCRA, 3 J.
MrN. L. & POL'Y 127 (1987); Comment, Judicial Review of National Regulations under
SMCRA and Holmes Limestone Company v. Andrus: Is the District Court for the
District of Columbia the Only Proper Forum?, 3 J. MN. L. & PoL'Y 167 (1987).
- Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981). In this case
mine operators challenged construction and application by the Secretary of the Interior
of SMCRA and its regulations. Id. at 733. The court held that the district court had
jurisdiction to enjoin OSMRE from enforcing prohibition of private surface mining
operations within 100 feet of a cemetery, and to have the regulation defining a cemetery
declared arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with SMCRA. Id. at 738-39.
Clinchfield Coal Company v. D.O.1., 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986); Drummond
Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469 (l1th Cir. 1984); Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel
Virginia Dep't of Conservation and Economic Dev. v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.
1984); Tug Valley Recovery Center v. Watt, 703 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1983).
- SMCRA § 201, 30 U.S.C. § 1211(g) (1982).
- SMCRA § 526, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982). (This section authorizes challenges
to actions by the Secretary constituting rulemaking.).
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The Mining and Reclamation Council of America,2 6 along
with the Regulatory Assistance Program,27 filed a petition for
rulemaking that requested the Secretary to initiate rulemaking
procedures to modify and amend the regulations which purport
to grant the Secretary the authority to issue NOV's in a state
with an approved regulatory program. 208 The Secretary published
a notice in the Federal Register of the filing of the petition for




The petition for rulemaking asserted that 30 C.F.R. Section
701.4(b)(3) 210 and Section 843.12(a)(2)2  were not authorized by
SMCRA and, therefore, are inconsistent with SMCRA.2 1 2 The
petition discussed the regulatory history of the regulations, as
"D The Mining and Reclamation Control Council of America is a National Trade
Association representing coal producers of all sizes, ancillary industries and state and
regional coal associations throughout the United States. The Mining and Reclamation
Council has now merged with the National Coal Association.
0' The Regulatory Assistance Program is an organization comprised of the follow-
ing State Coal Associations: Alabama Coal Association, Coal Operators and Associates,
Facts About Coal in Tennessee, Illinois Coal Association, Indiana Coal Council, Ken-
tucky Coal Association, The Ohio Coal and Energy Association, Ohio Mining and
Reclamation Association, Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association, and the West Virginia
Mining and Reclamation Association.
m Letter dated May 30, 1986 from Mr. Daniel Gerkin, President of the Mining
and Reclamation Council of America to OSMRE. 51 FED. REG. 27,198 (1987).
Id. at 27,197-204.
2,0 30 C.F.R. § 704.1(b)(3) (1984) states as follows: "[w]hile a State regulatory
program is in effect, the Office's responsibility includes but is not limited to ... issuing
notices of violation when a State regulatory authority fails to take appropriate action to
cause a violation to be corrected .... Id.
2,1 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1982) states as follows:
When, on the basis of any Federal inspection order other than one de-
scribed in paragraph (a)(l) of this section, an authorized representative of
the Secretary determines that there exists a violation of the Act, the State
program, or any condition of a permit or exploration approval required
by the Act which does not create an imminent danger or harm for which
a cessation order must be issued under section 843.11, the authorized
representative shall give a written report of the violation to the State and
to the permittee so that appropriate enforcement action can be taken by
the State. Where the State fails within 10 days after notification to take
appropriate action to cause the violation to be corrected, or to show good
cause for such failure, the authorized representative shall reinspect and, if
the violation continues to exist, shall issue a notice of violation or cessation
order as appropriate.
12 51 FED. REG. 27,199-203 (1986).
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well as the statutory provisions, the legislative history, and the
case law. 213 The petition further asserted that use of the NOV
had resulted in the Secretary's failure to resolve interpretational
disputes with the states, and had resulted in the failure to use
other procedures available to the Secretary to resolve these dis-
putes.
214
The Secretary published a notice of decision on the petition
for rulemaking in the Federal Register, 215 denying the petition
regarding the repeal of existing regulations authorizing the is-
suance of federal NOV's in primacy states. 216 The Federal Reg-
ister notice summarized the reasons for denial of this portion of
the rulemaking petition.2 17 The Secretary argued that the petition
did not present any arguments not previously considered in
earlier rulemakings and, therefore, administrative finality clearly
outweighed the benefits of proposing repeal. 218 The Secretary
also argued that the authority to issue NOV's acts as an intan-
gible deterrent contributing to enhanced compliance with the Act
and the state programs. 219 Another reason advanced was the
Secretary's need for the authority to issue NOV's in order to
comply with the terms of two federal court orders. 220 Also ad-
vanced as a justification was the difficulty in streamlining sub-
stitute enforcement procedures. 221 The Secretary also contended
that the process of substituting federal enforcement was a lengthy
and impractical approach to resolving site specific problems.
222
As a result of the Secretary's denial of the petition, the
parties who had filed the petition for rulemaking filed an action
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
213 Id.
21, Id.
2,1 52 FED. REG. 21,598-603 (1987).
2,6 Id. at 21,598.
Id. at 21,600-602.
2,s Id.
219 Id. at 21,601.
Id. (citing Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, No. 81-2134 (D.D.C.
Jan. 1985); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, No. 81-2238 (D.D.C.
1985)).
n, 52 FED. REG. 21,598, 21,600-02.
In 52 FED. REG. 21,598-603 (1987).
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for judicial review of the denial of the petition for rulemaking.
2
1
The complaint requested that 30 C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2) be
declared arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with SMCRA,
and that the Secretary be enjoined from acting pursuant to 30
C.F.R. Section 843.12(a)(2).
224
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICES OF VIOLATION
A. Types of Inspections
With the Secretary showing no inclination to reverse his
position concerning the authority to issue NOV's in primacy
states, and the judicial challenges to such authority being in the
early stages, 221 it is quite evident that the practice will continue.
Assuming arguendo that the Secretary has the authority to issue
NOV's in primacy states, what limitations and conditions apply?
As pointed out earlier, 226 any NOV issued pursuant to Section
521(a)(3) may only be issued for violations observed during
certain enumerated inspections. 227 This authority is contrasted
with the power to issue cessation orders for imminent dangers
"during any federal inspection."" 8 Even though this would be
an apparent restriction that Congress placed upon the power of
the Secretary to issue NOV's, the Secretary determined that there
existed a "statutory gap" 229 and the Secretary would not be
authorized to issue an NOV during an inspection carried out
' National Coal Ass'n et al v. Christensen et al, No. 87-2076 (D.D.C. July 27,
1987). The plaintiffs include the Alabama Coal Association, Coal Operators and Asso-
ciates, Facts About Coal In Tennessee, The Illinois Coal Association, Indiana Coal
Council, Kentucky Coal Association, Knott-Letcher-Perry Independent Coal Operators
Association, Ohio Coal and Energy Association, Ohio Mining and Reclamation Asso-
ciation, Association of Oklahoma General Contractors, Pennsylvania Coal Mining As-
sociation, and West Virginia Mining and Reclamation Association.
National Coal Ass'n, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Petition for Review, at 8-9.
"I Clinchfield Coal Co. v. D.O.I., 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986); National Coal
Ass'n et al v. Christensen et al., No. 87-2076 (D.D.C. July 17, 1987).
n' See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
12, Inspections pursuant to enforcement of a Federal Program, a Federal Lands
Program, SMCRA §§ 502, 504, 521, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(b), § 1271(b) (1982).
2 SMCRA § 521 (a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1982).
2" 44 FED. REo. 15,302 (1979).
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pursuant to Section 517(a)230 and impliedly Section 521(a)(1), 23'
Therefore, the Secretary having determined that the "gap" ex-
isted, proceeded to fill that gap by promulgating a regulation
which pur6orts to give OSM the authority to issue an NOV
during any federal inspection.~2 This is clearly a violation of
Congress' intent to limit the authority to issue NOV's while
granting much broader authority to issue imminent danger ces-
sation orders.233
B. Ten-D ay Notice
A second limitation or condition to the Secretary's authority
to issue NOV's in a primacy state is the requirement that the
state regulatory authority be given notice of the alleged violation
and ten days to respond.234 Both the statute and the regulations
require the Secretary to issue a "ten-day notice" to the state
regulatory authority. 235 This notice informs the state regulatory
authority that a violation exists and requires a state's response
within ten days. 236 A ten-day notice is not required where the
violation, condition, or practice creates an imminent danger and
the Secretary takes action pursuant to Section 521(a)(2). 23,
At issue concerning the ten-day notice is whether the issuance
of a ten-day notice to the regulatory authority is a jurisdictional
SMCRA § 517(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a) (1982), which provides:
The Secretary shall cause to be made such inspections of any surface coal
mining and reclamation operations as are necessary to evaluate the admin-
istration of approved State programs, or to develop or enforce any Federal
program, and for such purposes authorized representatives of the Secretary
shall have a right of entry to, upon or through any surface coal mining
and reclamation operations.
Id.
231 SMCRA § 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1982).
30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1982).
"The imminent danger or environmental harm closure provision is so critical
that the Federal Inspector is required to act even if the inspection is being made for
purposes of monitoring a State regulatory authority's performance." H.R. RaP. No.
218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977).
- 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2) (1982).
211 SMCRA § 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2)
(1982).
2 3 30 C.F.R. § 842.11(e)(l)(ii)(B) (1982).
' SMCRA § 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2)
(1982).
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prerequisite to the issuance of an NOV under Section 521(a)(3).
The purpose of the ten-day notice is to ensure that notification
of a violation is given to the state so that the state can proceed
under its approved program. 28 Given this Congressional state-
ment of intent that state authorities be notified, and that the
states have primary responsibility for enforcing the provisions
of the Act, 23 9 it follows that the Secretary's failure to issue a
ten-day notice is jurisdictional, thus invalidating any NOV issued
by the Secretary.
At least one administrative law judge has invalidated a fed-
eral NOV issued without the benefit of a ten-day notice being
provided to the state regulatory authority u° On appeal, the
Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed the AL's decision
without reaching this question. 24' The Board held that the chal-
lenge to the enforcement action should have been dismissed as
untimely and, therefore, the AU should not have reached the
issue of the failure of the Secretary to issue a ten-day notice.
24 2
Another administrative law judge has addressed the question
of whether the Secretary is required to issue a ten-day notice as
a prerequisite to issuing an NOV under Section 521(a)(3).2A 3 In
Patrick Coal Corp., the Secretary had issued an NOV at a-mine
site that had been mined under a less than two acre exemption.
42 "
Pursuant to a settlement agreement, the Secretary was required
to inspect a large number of mines in Virginia that had claimed
23 S. REP. No. 402, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973).
239 SMCRA § 101(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (1982), which states:
"[blecause of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical and other physical
conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility
for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining op-
erations subject to this act should rest with the states." Id.
P & K Co., Ltd. v. OSMRE, No. TU4-8-R (Aug. 1985) rev'd, 98 I.B.L.A. 26
(June 1, 1987). The ALJ held that an administrative agency must generally adhere to its
own regulations. However, this rule does not apply to internal agency procedural
regulations unless those regulations entitle a party to substantive benefits, exemptions or
procedural safeguards. Moreover, the ALJ held that failure of the Secretary to issue a
ten-day notice to the State regulatory authority denied the operator of a substantive
benefit, exemption, or procedural safeguard, and therefore the ALJ dismissed the notice
of violation. Id.
P1  & K Coal Co., Ltd. v. OSMRE, 98 I.B.L.A. 26 (June 2, 1987).
14 Id. at 34.
11 Patrick Coal Corp. v. OSMRE, 661 F. Supp. 380 (W.D. Va. 1987).
- Id. at 381 (SMCRA § 521(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1278(2) (1982) has been repealed.
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the two-acre exemption. 245 Because the sites were considered to
be exempt from the Act, the Virginia regulatory authority re-
quested OSMRE to cease issuing ten-day notices concerning these
sites. 24 This request was granted by OSMRE and, in this case,
no ten-day notice was issued prior to the issuance of the NOV.
247
At the administrative hearing the operator argued that the
federal inspection which gave rise to the NOV was not proper
since the Secretary had failed to give the regulatory authority
the required ten-day notice. 24 The Secretary asserted that he was
not required to issue the ten-day notice because: (1) the state
regulatory authority had waived its right to receive the ten-day
notices; (2) 30 C.F.R. Section 843.17249 relieved the Secretary of
the obligation to issue a ten-day notice; and (3) the operator did
not have standing to assert the defense of failure to issue a ten-
day notice, arguing that only the state regulatory authority could
challenge the failure to issue a ten-day notice.
20
The ALJ found that the state regulatory authority had not
waived any rights to receive ten-day notices prior to the carrying
out of a federal inspection.2 1 The judge also found that 30
C.F.R. Section 842.17 only applies when the Secretary is en-




Temporary relief was denied, and the action was appealed
by the operator to the district court. The district court also
denied temporary relief and found that the Secretary was not
required to issued a ten-day notice prior to ordering a federal
inspection and issuing the NOV. Reasoning that since the ten-
day notice provision was primarily for the benefit of the state,
the court held that the state could waive the provision.
253
5 Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, No. 81-2134 (D.D.C. Jan. 31,
1985).
Patrick Coal Corp., 661 F. Supp. 380, 384 (W.D. Va. 1987).
N7 Id.
141 Id. at 382.
p- "No notice of violation, cessation order .. . may be vacated for failure to give
the [ten-day] notice to the State regulatory authority required under section
842.11(b)(l)(ii)(B) ... " 30 C.F.R. § 843.17 (1982).
2M Patrick Coal Corporation v. OSMRE, No. NX6-28-R, at 9-10 (Feb. 3, 1986),
aff'd, 661 F. Supp. 380 (W.D. Va. 1987).
Id. at 10-11.
" Id.
2" Patrick Coal Corp., 661 F. Supp. at 380.
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1. Appropriate Action
Once the Secretary has notified the state regulatory authority
of an alleged violation, the state has ten days to take "appro-
priate action" or "show good cause for failure to take such
action. ' 25 4 At present neither of these terms have been defined
in the statute or the regulations. The Secretary has stated that
"the crucial response of a state is to take whatever enforcement
action is necessary to secure abatement of the violation. ' 255 The
obvious problem with such an interpretation is first, such an
interpretation presupposes that a violation exists. If the violative
condition or practice which the Secretary alleges is not consid-
ered by the state regulatory authority to be a violation of its
statute and regulations or is in fact permitted by the state, an
intepretational or programmatic dispute between the Secretary
and the state regulatory authority results. Under the present
system the dispute results in the operator or permittee being
issued a notice of violation and thus subject to the full range of
administrative, civil, and criminal penalties under the Act.
256
Such a procedure does not result in a resolution of the interpre-
tational or programmatic differences between the Secretary and
the state regulatory authority.
The second problem arising from the interpretation that
appropriate action is whatever enforcement action is required to
abate the violation is that, by definition, the Secretary will only
accept the issuance of some type of state regulatory authority
enforcement action. There are various actions that can be taken
by a state regulatory authority to address situations that do not
take the form of an enforcement action with its concomitant
penalties .257
Decisions of the Office of Hearing and Appeals and the
Interior Board of Land Appeals underscore this interpretation
of "appropriate action" as whatever action is necessary to abate
the violation. These decisions hold that no action by the state
2- SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(I) (1982).
"1 47 FED. REG. 35,627-628 (1982).
256 SMCRA § 518, 30 U.S.C. § 1268 (1982).
"I See, e.g., SMCRA § 518, 30 U.S.C. § 1268 (1982).
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after receipt of the ten-day notice is not appropriate action.
2
1
They have also held that issuance of enforcement action by the
state regulatory authority without follow-up or without achieving
abatement of the violation is not appropriate action. 2 9 Other
cases have held that reliance upon a decision by a state hearing
officer is not appropriate action ° nor is failure to take action
because of a state court injunction. 261 In a recent decision by the
Interior Board of Land Appeals appropriate action was found




If the term "appropriate action" is not defined by the Sec-
retary but only interpreted as any action necessary to ensure
abatement of the violation, then the second term, "good cause
for failure to take such action," 263 is both undefined and unin-
terpreted. A good argument can be made that the phrase has
been written out of Section 521.264 There are several responses
that would seem to fit within "good cause for failure to take
appropriate action." One such response would be that no vio-
lation exists. This response is usually made in two ways. First,
the violation has been abated by the time of the state inspection
or secondly, the violative conditon was not observed during the
state inspection in response to the ten-day notice.
15, Turner Bros., Inc. v. OSMRE, No. TU-4-10-R (U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office
of Hearing and Appeals, Feb. 4, 1985).
219 Turner Bros., Inc. v. OSMRE, No. TU-4-5-R (U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of
Hearings and Appeals, Feb. 4, 1985); see also Turner Bros., Inc. v. OSMRE, Nos. TU-
4-3-R, TU-4-6-R (U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Feb. 19,
1985); Peabody Coal Co. v. OSMRE, No. TU-4-12-R (U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of
Hearings and Appeals, May 2, 1985).
- Virginia Citizens for Better Reclamation and Virginia D. Hill, 82 I.B.L.A. 37
(1984).
26, Thomas J. Fitzgerald, 88 I.B.L.A. 24 (1985).
26 Turner Bros. Inc., v. OSMRE, 99 I.B.L.A. 87 (September 15, 1987).
3 SMCRA § 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1982).
- Since the issuance of a ten-day notice by the Secretary to the State regulatory
authority presupposes that a violation of the Act or the regulations exists, it would seem
an impossibility for the State regulatory authority to be able to give any response to the
Secretary which would be construed as showing good cause for failure to take "appro-
priate action."
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Another response that could amount to a showing of good
cause for failure to take such action would be that the regulatory
authority has determined through its interpretation of the state
program that the condition or practice is neither a violation nor
unacceptable. 265 This type of response normally gives rise to an
interpretational dispute, wherein the operator or permittee pays
the price through the issuance of a federal NOV without reso-
lution of the dispute between the Secretary and the state regu-
latory authority.26 This was precisely the situation in Clinchfield
Coal Co. v. Hodel.
26 7
A third response that should fit into the good cause category
is that the state regultory authority is unable or without juris-
diction to take action or that the state regulatory authority has
no jurisdiction over the condition or practice. 268 This type of
response is illustrated by a practice which occurred a few years
ago when the Secretary issued ten-day notices to several state
regulatory authorities requesting that the regulatory authority
take enforcement actions against operators who owed federal
Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation (AML) fees. 269 Many of the
regulatory authorities responded that they did not have jurisdic-
tion to take enforcement action for failure to pay the reclamation
fees. They reasoned that the reclamation fee was a fee or tax
assessed by the Secretary against each operator of surface coal
mining operations in the nation. 20 The payment of such fees is
required by the Act but state regulatory authorities are not
required to assess or collect such fees and, therefore, a failure
to pay such fees is not a violation of the state program. In some
states the Secretary found this to be an appropriate response,
26S See Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Hodel, 640 F. Supp. 334 (W.D, Va. 1985).
2" Id.
I ld.
See Ryans Coal Co., Inc. v. OSM, No. CV83-PT-0623-J (N.D. Ala. April 4,
1983).
SMCRA § 402(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1982) provides:
All operators of coal mining operations subject to the provisions of this
Act shall pay to the Secretary of the Interior, for deposit in the fund,
reclamation fee of 35 cents per ton of coal produced by surface coal mining
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i.e., good cause for failure to take action, while in other states
the Secretary found the same response to be an inappropriate
response, i.e., not appropriate action or not good cause for
failure to take action.
2 71
3. Proposed Regulatory Definitions
In response to the rulemaking petition filed by the Mining
and Reclamation Council and the Regulatory Assistance Pro-
gram, 272 the Secretary agreed to inititate rulemaking in order to
amend the regulations, establishing a uniform standard for the
Secretary's evaluation of responses by state regulatory authorities
to ten-day notices and defining the terms "appropriate action"
and "good cause for failure to take such action." '27 The Secre-
tary has published a proposed rule274 that defines appropriate
action as "enforcement or other action authorized under the
state program to cause the violation to be corrected. "275 While
this approach still presupposes the existence of a violation, it at
least now recognizes that the state regulatory authority, under
its program, may take other actions short of NOV's or cessation
orders that would result in corrective action being taken. The
proposed rule would also find "good cause" if:
1) the alleged violation does not or did not exist;
2) more time is needed to investigate the existence of the alleged
violation;
3) the state lacked jurisdiction over the alleged violation;
4) an injunction restrains action against the alleged violation;
5) the state was diligently pursuing or exhausting other appro-
priate enforcement actions; or
6) there was preclusion or futility of enforcement due to ex-
traordinary circumstances.2 76
2, The author learned of this practice while an Assistant Attorney General repre-
senting the Virginia Regulatory Authority and through interviews with legal counsel for
the Kentucky and Maryland regulatory authorities.
22 51 FED. REG. 27,197-204 (1986).
273 52 FED. REG. 21,598-603 (1987).
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Concerning the term "appropriate action," the proposed rule
states that other action authorized under the state program to
cause a violation to be corrected could include requiring the
operator or permittee to revise or modify its permit. 277 It may
also include commencement of forfeiture proceedings by the
state regulatory authority against the performance bond 278 if the
performance bond is adequate to correct the violation and achieve
reclamation. 27 9 The proposed rule provides that these are not
exhaustive of all of the acceptable responses which would be
considered appropriate action.
2 0
The Secretary's proposed rule then discusses the various
categories28' that would constitute "good cause." One category
is that a violation did not or does not exist. If the Secretary
disagrees, he would be required to demonstrate that the state's
response was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion
under the state program in order to authorize the issuance of an
enforcement action.2 2 If the Secretary is unable to demonstrate
that the state decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion, but the Secretary still contends that there is a viola-
tion of the Act or federal regulations, the Secretary would notify
the state regulatory authority of a program deficiency pursuant
to 30 C.F.R. Section 732.17(e).
283
z" SMCRA § 511(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1261(c) (1982); 30 C.F.R. § 774.11 (1982).
"I All surface coal mining operations must furnish to the regulatory authority a
performance bond. SMCRA § 509, 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (1982).
30 C.F.R. § 800.50(a) (1987) provides:
If an operator refuses or is unable to conduct reclamation of an unabated
violation, if the terms of the permit are not met, or if the operator defaults
on the conditions under which the bond was accepted, the regulatory
authority shall take ... action to force all or part of a bond or bonds for
any permit area ....
Id.
" 52 FED. REG. 34,051 (1987). OSMRE left open the question of what constitutes
"appropriate action," stating that OSMRE invites public comments on other responses
by a State regulatory authority which may constitute "other action." Id.
Id. at 34,051-52.
282 Id. at 34,052.
Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. § 732.12(e) (1987). 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(e) (1987) provides:
State program amendments may be required when as a result of changes
in the Act or regulations of this chapter, of the approved State program
no longer meets the requirements of the Act or this chapter; or conditions
or events change the implementation, administration or enforcement of the
19881
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If the state responds that it lacks jurisdiction, the state
regulatory authority would not be required to take action in a
situation not covered by its program. In such situations, the
Secretary would confer with the State regulatory authority and
take action necessary pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Section 732.17.284
The proposed rule would also recognize "good cause" where
the state regulatory authority was enjoined from acting as a
result of an injunction or other order. A finding of "good
cause" would be conditioned upon evidence that the state reg-
ulatory authority was seeking relief against the injunction.
28 5 If
not, the state action would be examined for a determination as
to whether such action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion. "Good cause" could also be found if the state reg-
ulatory authority was diligently pursuing or had exhausted other
appropriate enforcement actions .
2
86
The proposed rulemaking would also establish a procedure
whereby the state regulatory authority could have informal re-
view of the Secretary's written determination that the state's
response to a ten-day notice was arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion of the state program.217 The proposed rule
provides that during the review process no federal inspection
could be conducted, nor could any notice of violation be is-
sued. 288 This would not affect the Secretary's responsibility to
issue cessation orders in imminent danger situations. 2 9 The pro-
posed rule would make the decision of the Deputy Director of
OSMRE reversing the initial determination reviewable pursuant
to 30 C.F.R. 842.15290 if the initial decision resulted from a
State program; or conditions or events indicate that the approved State
program no longer meets the requirements of the Act of this chapter.
Id.
" 52 FED. REG. 34,052 (1987).
z Id.
SMCRA §§ 521(a), 520(c), 518(0, 518(g), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1271(a), 1270(c), 1268(0,
1268(g) (1982).
M7 52 FED. REG. 34,050 (1987).
81 Id. at 34,052.
Id. at 34,052-053.
2 30 C.F.R. § 842.15 (1987), which provides:
Any person with an interest which may be adversely affected by a surface
coal mining operation may seek informal review of an Inspector's decision
not to inspect or to take enforcement action with respect to any violation
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request for a federal inspection pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Section
842.12.291
The Secretary's proposed rule, if finally promulgated, would
go a long way in resolving many of the current interpretational
disputes between OSMRE and the state regulatory authority
which in the past have resulted in federal NOV's being issued
to the operator or permittee without any resolution of the un-
derlying dispute. By agreeing to more specifically define the
terms "appropriate action" and "good cause for failure to take
such action," the Secretary is attempting to pay the states more
deference and is breathing more life back into the concept of
primacy.
Unfortunately, the Secretary will not retreat from his incor-
rect interpretation that the Act authorizes issuance of federal
NOV's in primacy states without resorting to the procedure set
out in Section 521(b) and 30 C.F.R. Section 733. While this
proposed rulemaking attempts to establish a forum wherein the
states may at least argue their position, it must be remembered
that this is only a proposed rulemaking. There is every likelihood
that strong opposition will be brought to bear on these proposed
rules. If the Secretary is truly committed to the concept of
primacy and to allowing the states to exercise the primary re-
sponsibility in enforcing and carrying out the Act, then it should
be expected that the Secretary will vigorously defend these pro-
posals to insure that they are finally adopted.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977, Congress intended the states to be primarily responsible
for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act. Congress also
intended the federal government to have only a limited oversight
role in the implementation and enforcement of the Act by those
alleged by that person. OSMRE conducts the review and informs the person
of the results of such review. This informal review is appealable to the
Office of Hearings and Appeals.
Id.
52 FED. REao. 34,052-053 (1982) (This regulation authorizes any person upon a
signed written statement of reasonable belief of a violation to request a Federal inspec-
tion.).
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states that obtained primacy. This limited oversight role is in-
tended to allow the Secretary of the Interior to evaluate the
various states' performance and to take action, if necessary, to
substitute federal enforcement of the state program and to im-
plement a federal program. It also allows the Secretary to issue
cessation orders against conditons, practices, or violations that
create "imminent danger to the health or safety of the public
or are causing, or can reasonably be expected to cause signifi-
cant, imminent environmental harm to land, air, or water re-
sources." The Act does not allow the Secretary to issue an NOV
to an operator of a surface coal mining operation in a state
which has an approved regulatory program, unless enforcement
of the state program is being carried out by the Secretary pur-
suant to Sections 504(b) or 521(b). This is clearly evident not
only in the plain language of the Act but also in the Act's
legislative history.
292
The Secretary's attempt through rulemaking to issue NOV's
in primacy states is clearly inconsistent with the Act and beyond
the authority of the Secretary. However, because of the rather
restrictive provisions of the Act concerning judicial review of
the Secretary's regulations, direct actions challenging the pur-
ported authority of the Secretary to issue these NOV's have been
dismissed as not within the jurisdiction of the courts to decide.
The pending action brought by the National Coal Association
and others in the District Court of the District of Columbia may
finally result in a valid decision determining this authority. Until
such time, however, it is likely that the Secretary will continue
to issue such NOV's in primacy states.
Under the present situation very few limitations apply to the
authority of the Secretary to issue such NOV's in primacy states.
Whether the issuance of a ten-day notice is a jurisdictional
requirement to the issuance of an NOV in a primacy state would
seem to be answered in the negative by 30 C.F.R. Section 843.17
and by Patrick Coal Company v. OSMRE.293 The limitation
contained in Section 521(a)(3), which clearly indicates that an
NOV may not be issued during inspections conducted pursuant
29 See supra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.
293 No. 86-0039-A (W.D. Va. May 22, 1987).
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to Section 517 and 521(a)(1) has been improperly eradicated by
the Secretary's regulations. Finally, the requirement that the
notice of violation may only be issued in the absence of "ap-
propriate action" or "good cause for failure to take such ac-
tion" by the state regulatory authority has been interpreted and
construed to be, at best, a very narrow limitation.
Hopefully, the proposed rule published by the Secretary
which would more specifically define what constitutes "appro-
priate action" and "good cause for failure to take appropriate
action" and require the Secretary to find, in some instances,
that a state's regulatory response is arbritrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion will resuscitate these limitations and give
greater deference to the states in interpreting and enforcing their
approved programs. However, the Secretary must resist pressure
from opponents of state primacy to emasculate this long needed
rulemaking. While the rulemaking, if finalized as proposed, will
afford greater deference to the states, it does not go far enough
to remedy the Secretary's usurpation of Congress' clear intent
that the Secretary should have no authority to directly issue
NOV's in primacy states where no action has been initiated by
the Secretary to substitute federal enforcement or to withdraw
state program approval.
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